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This paper develops an open economy model with heterogeneous final goods producers who 
simultaneously choose whether to export their goods and whether to use imported 
intermediates. The model highlights mechanisms whereby import policies affect aggregate 
productivity, resource allocation, and industry export activity along both the extensive and 
intensive margins. Using the theoretical model, we develop and estimate a structural empirical 
model that incorporates heterogeneity in productivity and shipping costs using Chilean plant-
level data for a set of manufacturing industries. The estimated model is consistent with the 
key features of the data regarding productivity, exporting, and importing. We perform a 
variety of counterfactual experiments to assess quantitatively the positive and normative 
effects of barriers to trade in import and export markets. These experiments suggest that there 
are substantial aggregate productivity and welfare gains due to trade. Furthermore, because of 
import and export complementarities, policies which inhibit the importation of foreign 
intermediates can have a large adverse effect on the exportation of final goods. 
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This paper develops a stochastic industry model of heterogeneous ﬁrms to examine the eﬀects of
trade liberalization on resource reallocation, industry productivity, and welfare in the presence
of import and export complementarities. We use the theoretical model to develop empirical
models which we estimate using Chilean plant-level data for a set of manufacturing industries.
The estimated models are then used to perform counterfactual experiments regarding diﬀerent
trading regimes to assess the positive and normative eﬀects of barriers to trade in import and
export markets.
Previous empirical work suggests that there is a substantial degree of resource reallocation
across ﬁrms within an industry following trade liberalization and these shifts in resources con-
tribute to productivity growth. Pavcnik (2002) uses Chilean data and ﬁnds such reallocations
and productivity eﬀects after trade liberalization in that country. Treﬂer (2004) estimates these
eﬀects in Canadian manufacturing following the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement using plant-
and industry-level data and ﬁnds signiﬁcant increases in productivity among both importers and
exporters.
Empirical evidence also suggests that relatively more productive ﬁrms are more likely to
export.1 In this paper we provide empirical evidence that whether or not a ﬁrm is importing
intermediates for use in production may also be important for explaining diﬀerences in plant
performance.2 Our data suggests that ﬁrms which both import intermediates and export their
output tend to be larger and more productive than ﬁrms that are active in either market, but
not both. Hence, the impact of trade on resource reallocation across ﬁrms which are importing
may be as important as shifts across exporting ﬁrms.
Melitz (2003), motivated by the empirical ﬁndings regarding exporters described above, de-
velops a monopolistic competition model of exporters with diﬀerent productivities and examines
the eﬀect of trade liberalization.3 To address simultaneously the empirical regularities concern-
1See, for example, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard, et al. (2003),
Clerides, Lack and Tybout (1998), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004a). Other observations on ﬁrm level
exports include: (a) a majority of ﬁrms do not export, (b) most exporters only export a small fraction of their
output, and (c) most exporters only export to a small number of countries.
2See also Amiti and Konings (2005), Halpern, Korn, and Szeidl (2006), and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2005) for
evidence of a positive relationship between importing inputs and productivity. Few empirical studies simultane-
ously examine both exports and imports at the micro-level. A notable exception is Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2005) who provide empirical evidence regarding both importers and exporters in the U.S.
3Several alternative trade theories with heterogeneous ﬁrms have been developed as well. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) develop a Ricardian model of trade with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004b)
explore a model that nests both the Richardian framework of Eaton and Kortum and the monopolistic compe-
tition approach of Melitz. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) present a monopolistic competition model with
2ing importers, we begin by extending his model to incorporate imported intermediate goods. In
the model, the use of foreign intermediates increases a ﬁrm’s productivity (because of increasing
returns) but, due to ﬁxed costs of importing, only inherently highly productive ﬁrms import
intermediates. Thus, a ﬁrm’s productivity aﬀects its participation decision in international mar-
kets (i.e. importing inputs and/or exporting output) and, conversely, this participation decision
(i.e. importing inputs) aﬀects its productivity.
In this environment, trade liberalization which lowers restrictions on the importation of
intermediates increases aggregate productivity because some inherently productive ﬁrms start
importing and achieve within-plant productivity gains. This, in turn, leads to a resource reallo-
cation from less productive to more productive importing ﬁrms, enhancing the positive aggregate
productivity eﬀect. Furthermore, productivity gains from importing intermediates may allow
some importers to start exporting, leading to a resource reallocation along the intensive margin.
In equilibrium, higher labor demand from new importers and exporters increases the real wage
and, as a result, the least productive ﬁrms exit from the market. Thus, the model identiﬁes an
important mechanism whereby import tariﬀ policy aﬀects aggregate exports and this interaction
is essential for understanding the impact of trade policy on aggregate productivity and welfare.4
Using the theoretical model, we develop and estimate a structural empirical model of exports
and imports using a panel of Chilean plants from a set of manufacturing industries (structural
metals, wearing apparel, and plastic products). The data is well-suited for our study as Chile
underwent a signiﬁcant trade liberalization from 1974-1979 but had fairly stable trade policies,
and savings, investment, and growth rates during our sample period from 1990-1996. Further-
more, a signiﬁcant portion of Chilean imports are in chemicals, electrical machinery, and heavy
industrial machinery which is consistent with our theoretical focus on imported intermediate
inputs.
We consider an extended empirical model that incorporates sunk costs and ﬁrm-level het-
erogeneity in international shipping costs. The inclusion of sunk costs and other features of the
model allows us to capture the high degree of persistence in a plant’s export and import status
apparent in the data. The estimated model also replicates the observed patterns of productivity
heterogeneous ﬁrms that focuses on the ﬁrm’s choice between exports and foreign direct investment. Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2007) develop a model of endowment-driven comparative advantage with heterogeneous
ﬁrms to examine both across and within industry reallocations in response to trade liberalization.
4It should be noted that in standard trade theory, restrictions on imports of ﬁnal goods will lower exports
of ﬁnal goods so as to maintain balanced trade. In this paper, we are studying a diﬀerent mechanism whereby
import restrictions on intermediates decreases exports of ﬁnal goods through their negative eﬀect on productivity
in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms and trading costs.
3across ﬁrms with diﬀerent import and export status as well as the observed distribution of export
and import intensities. It is also consistent with the high degree of trade concentration among
a small number of plants in our data. For example, the observation that the top ﬁve percent of
exporters account for more than forty percent of total exports in the plastic products industry.
For each industry in our study, we ﬁnd that the estimated mean of the productivity distribu-
tion at the steady state is signiﬁcantly higher than the estimated mean at entry, suggesting that
selection through endogenous exit plays an important role in determining industry productivity.
Furthermore, the estimated model indicates that ﬁrms with high productivity and low shipping
costs tend to self-select into exporting and importing. Hence, heterogeneity in both productivity
and shipping costs are signiﬁcant in determining export and import status.
To examine the eﬀects of trade policies, we perform a variety of counterfactual experiments
that explicitly take into account equilibrium price adjustments. The experiments suggest that
the welfare gains in moving from autarky to trade are substantial, with increases in real ag-
gregate income ranging from 3-7 percent. Furthermore, we estimate that industry total factor
productivity increases between 14-34 percent when trade is liberalized. Another important ﬁnd-
ing is that because of importing and exporting complementarities, policies which inhibit the
importation of foreign intermediates can have a large adverse eﬀect on the exportation of ﬁnal
goods, causing exports to fall by approximately 25% in each of the industries we study.
Our paper is a contribution to the recent empirical literature which seeks to structually
estimate international models with heterogeneous ﬁrms using plant-level data in order to examine
the quantitative implications of trade policies. For instance, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007)
use Columbian plant-level data for three manufacturing industries to examine the eﬀects of
trade liberalization and export subsidies on exports. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2007) use
a panel of Hungarian ﬁrms to explore relationships between importing and plant productivity.
Using Indonesian data, Rodrigue (2007) estimates a model with foreign direct investment and
exporting. Our results complement these papers but with particular focus on the interaction
between importing and exporting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on
the distribution of importers and exporters and their performance using Chilean manufacturing
plant-level data. Section 3 presents a theoretical model with import and export complemen-
tarities. Section 4 provides details and results of the structural estimation of empirical models
based on the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
4Table 1: Exporters and Importers in Chile for 1990-1996 (% of Total)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1990-96 ave.
Exporters 8.4 9.7 9.2 9.2 8.6 9.7 8.8 9.1
Importers 12.6 12.1 13.1 12.9 13.5 11.8 12.0 12.6
Ex/Importers 8.2 9.5 10.7 11.8 13.4 12.5 12.6 11.3
Exports by Exporters 48.4 37.8 49.3 44.9 32.6 38.1 40.5 41.6
Exports by Ex/Importers 51.6 62.2 50.7 55.1 67.4 61.9 59.5 58.4
Imports by Importers 34.8 32.1 31.5 27.8 22.0 20.8 26.7 28.0
Imports by Ex/Importers 65.2 67.9 68.5 72.2 78.0 79.2 73.3 72.0
Output by Exporters 17.4 16.7 23.4 18.9 15.2 20.1 17.8 18.5
Output by Importers 16.8 12.9 14.9 15.0 14.1 13.3 14.4 14.5
Output by Ex/Importers 39.1 44.1 40.5 43.8 50.2 46.3 47.5 44.5
No. of Plants 4584 4764 4937 5041 5081 5110 5464 4997
Notes: Exporters refers to plants that export but do not import. Importers refers to plants that import but do not export.
Ex/Importers refers to plants that both export and import.
2 Empirical Motivation
In this section we brieﬂy describe Chilean plant-level manufacturing data and provide summary
statistics to characterize patterns and trends of plants which may or may not participate in
international markets. Section 4.5 describes the data set in further detail.
Table 1 provides several important basic facts about exporters and importers. The fraction
of plants that are engaged in trade is relatively small but has increased over time as shown
in the ﬁrst three rows of Table 1. Furthermore, as shown in the fourth through seventh rows
of that table, plants that both export and import account for a larger fraction of exports and
imports than their counterparts which only export or only import. In addition, the percentage
of total output accounted for by ﬁrms which were engaged in international trade increased from
73.3% in 1990 to 79.7% in 1996. Plants that both exported and imported became increasingly
important in accounting for total output: they constitute only 12.6% of the sample but account
for 47.5% of total output in 1996. Overall, this table indicates that plants that engage in both
exporting and importing are increasingly common and are important contributors to output and
the volume of trade.
Exports and imports are highly concentrated among a small number of plants.5 Table 2
reports the shares of total exports and imports in the top 1, 5, and 10 percentiles of exporting
and importing plants. As indicated in the ﬁrst two columns, export concentration is very high,
with the top 1 percent of exporting plants accounting for 39.8% of total exports; furthermore,
5Bernard et al. (2005) ﬁnd U.S. exports and imports to be concentrated among a very small number of ﬁrms.
5Table 2: Export and Import Concentration, 1990-1996 average
Exports Imports
% of Total Exports % of Ex/Importers % of Total Imports % of Ex/Importers
Top 1% 39.8 54.2 25.8 79.6
Top 5% 67.3 66.2 51.3 77.7
Top 10% 80.1 63.2 65.8 72.7
Notes: “Ex/Importers” refers to plants that both export and import while “% of Ex/Importers” refers to the fraction of
Ex/Importers in the top 1, 5, and 10% of exporting or importing plants.
Table 3: Distribution of Export and Import Intensities
Export or Import Percentage of Percentage of











Notes: Export and import intensities are reported only for exporting and importing plants. The statistics are calculated
from all observations in 1990-1996.
a majority of the top 1 percent of exporters are plants that engage in both exporting and
importing. Importers show a similar pattern although the degree of concentration is slightly
lower than exporters while plants that both export and import play a more important role for
the concentration of imports.
We also examine the degree of exporting and importing for plants by reporting the distrib-
ution of export and import intensities in Table 3. A plant’s export intensity is deﬁned as the
ratio of its export sales to total sales while its import intensity is the ratio of expenditures on
imported intermediate inputs to total expenditures on intermediate inputs. The table reports
the fraction of observations in our sample of exporting or importing plants in each intensity
bin. As the table suggests there is a sizable degree of heterogeneity across plants with regard to
export and import intensities. The average export intensity is 25% with a standard deviation
of .30 while the average import intensity is 29% with a standard deviation of .25.
We now turn to measures of plant performance and their relationships with export and import
status. While the diﬀerences in a variety of plant attributes between exporters and non-exporters
are well-known (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999), few previous empirical studies have discussed
6Table 4: Premia of Exporter and Importer
Pooled OLS: 1990-1996 Fixed Eﬀects: 1990-1996
Export/Import Status Exporters Importers Ex/Importers Exporters Importers Ex/Importers
Total Employment 0.889 0.660 1.495 0.101 0.043 0.138
(0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Total Sales 0.325 0.546 0.756 0.110 0.074 0.158
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Value Added per Worker 0.327 0.490 0.688 0.100 0.053 0.125
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020)
Average Wage 0.210 0.323 0.423 0.055 0.043 0.062
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Non-Production/Total Workers 0.033 0.210 0.345 0.038 0.031 0.056
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
Capital per Worker 0.495 0.512 0.866 0.066 0.016 0.134
(0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
No. of Observations 34981 33853
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Total Employment” reports the estimates for exporter/importer premia from a
regression excluding the logarithm of total employment from the set of regressors. Because they are observed only for one
period, 1128 plant observations are dropped from the ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
how plant performance measures depend on import status. Table 4 presents estimated premia
in various performance measures according to export and import status. Following Bernard
and Jensen (1999), columns 1-3 of this table report export and import premia estimated from a
pooled ordinary least squares regression using data from 1990-1996:






it + Zitβ + ǫit, (1)
where Xit is a vector of plant attributes (employment, sales, labor productivity, wage, non-
production worker ratio, and capital per worker). Here, dx
it is a dummy for year t’s export
status, dm
it is a dummy for year t’s import status, Z includes industry dummies at the four-digit
ISIC level, year dummies, and total employment to control for size. The export premium, α1,
is the average percentage diﬀerence between exporters and non-exporters among plants that do
not import foreign intermediates. The import premium, α2, is the average percentage diﬀerence
between importers and non-importers among plants that do not export. Finally, α3 captures the
percentage diﬀerence between plants that neither export nor import and plants that do both.
The results in Table 4 show that there are substantial diﬀerences not only between exporters
and non-exporters but also between importers and non-importers. The export premia among
non-importers are positive and signiﬁcant for all characteristics as shown in column 1. The im-
port premia among non-exporters are positive and signiﬁcant for all characteristics in column 2,
suggesting the importance of import status in explaining plant performance even after control-
ling for export status. Comparing columns 1-2 with column 3, plants that are both exporting
7and importing tend to be larger and be more productive than plants that are engaged in either
exporting or importing but not both.6
We also estimate (1) using a ﬁxed eﬀects regression to control for plant speciﬁc eﬀects. The
results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 4. They show similar patterns to those based on the
pooled OLS in columns 1-3. Notably, all the point estimates for column 6 are larger than those
reported in columns 4-5, suggesting that plants that are both exporting and importing are larger
and more productive than other plants. The point estimates suggest that the magnitude of the
performance gap for various characteristics across diﬀerent export/import status are substantial.
3 A Model of Exports and Imports
Motivated by the empirical evidence presented above, we now extend the trading environment
studied by Melitz (2003) to include importing of intermediates by heterogeneous ﬁnal goods
producers.
3.1 Environment
The world is comprised of N + 1 identical countries. Within each country there is a set of ﬁnal
goods producers and a set of intermediate goods producers.
3.1.1 Consumers
In each country there is a representative consumer who supplies labour inelastically at level







σ−1, where ω is an index over varieties, and σ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between varieties. Letting p(ω) denote the price of variety ω, we can derive









 1/(1−σ) and Q is a consumption index with Q = U. Expenditure on







where R = PQ =
 
ω∈Ω r(ω)dω is aggregate expenditure.
6Since export status is positively correlated with import status, the magnitude of the export premia estimated
without controlling for import status is likely to be overestimated by capturing the import premia.
83.1.2 Production
We ﬁrst describe the ﬁnal goods sector which is characterized by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms selling horizontally diﬀerentiated goods. This sector is our primary focus.
Final goods ﬁrms sell to domestic consumers and in the trading environment choose whether or
not to also export their goods to foreign consumers. In production, ﬁnal goods producers employ
labor, domestically produced intermediates, and choose whether or not to also use imported
intermediates.
There is an unbounded measure of ex ante identical potential entrants. Upon entering, an
entrant pays a ﬁxed entry cost, fe. Each new entrant then draws a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
parameter, ϕ, from a continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ). A ﬁrm’s productivity remains
at this level throughout its operation. After observing ϕ, a ﬁrm decides whether to immediately
exit or stay in the market. All ﬁnal goods producers must pay a ﬁxed production cost, f,
each period to continue in operation. In addition, in each period, a ﬁrm is forced to exit with
probability ξ.
In the open economy, ﬁrms must also pay ﬁxed costs associated with importing intermediates
and exporting their product in any period that they choose to be active in those markets. Before
making their import and export decisions, ﬁrms draw a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock to the ﬁxed cost of
importing. This shock is denoted ǫ and is identically and independently distributed across ﬁrms
and across time with a continuous cumulative distribution H(ǫ) deﬁned over [ǫ,¯ ǫ] with zero
mean. The total ﬁxed cost per import market for a ﬁrm which is importing but not exporting
equals fm + ǫ > 0. A ﬁrm that is exporting but not importing incurs a non-stochastic cost of
fx > 0 each period for each export market. Finally, a ﬁrm that is both exporting and importing
incurs a ﬁxed cost equal to ζ(fx + fm + ǫ) for each market, where 0 < ζ ≤ 1 determines the
degree of complementarity in ﬁxed costs between exporting and importing.7
We let dx ∈ {0,1} denote a ﬁrm’s export decision where dx = 0 implies that a ﬁrm does
not export their good and let dm ∈ {0,1} denote a ﬁrm’s import decision where dm = 0 implies
that a ﬁrm does not use imported intermediates. Finally, let d = (dx,dm) denote a ﬁnal good
producer’s export/import status. With this notation, we can write the total per-period ﬁxed
7We impose lower bounds on the values for fx and fm + ¯ ǫ and upper bounds on fm + ǫ which guarantee that
there is a positive measure of ﬁrms in each export/import category in the open economy equilibrium. These
restrictions are similar to the condition imposed by Melitz (2003) which ensures that his economy is characterized
by partitioning of ﬁrms by export status. These derivations as well as full derivations of the theoretical results
discussed below are presented in a supplementary appendix which is available upon request.
9cost of a ﬁrm that chooses d and draws ǫ as
F(d,ǫ) = f + Nζdxdm
[dxfx + dm(fm + ǫ)]
The technology for a ﬁrm with inherent productivity level ϕ and import status dm is given
by:
q(ϕ,dm) = ϕlα













where l is labor input, xo(j) is input of domestically-produced intermediate variety j, x(j) is
input of imported intermediate variety j, 0 < α < 1 is the labor share, and γ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between any two intermediate inputs.
Note that this production function incorporates increasing returns to variety in intermediate
inputs using an approach similar to that used in many applications in macroeconomics, growth,
and international economics.8 As is well-known, this feature of the production function implies
that ﬁrms which use a wider variety of intermediates (here, through importing), will have higher
total factor productivity. Thus, our environment is consistent with the empirical evidence pre-
sented in Section Two and in Amiti and Konings (2005), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2006),
and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2005) which suggest that the use of foreign intermediate goods is
associated with higher plant productivity.9
In the intermediate goods industry, there is a continuum of ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated
goods. The measure of varieties produced within a country is ﬁxed at one.10 Anyone can access
the blueprints of the intermediate production technology for all varieties and there is free entry.
Firms have identical linear technologies in labor input with marginal product equal to one.
These conditions imply that domestic intermediates sold in the domestic market will all have
price equal to the wage which we normalize to one. We allow for iceberg importing costs so
τm > 1 units of an intermediate good must be shipped abroad for 1 unit to arrive.
8See, for example, Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a, 1996b), Ethier (1982), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
and Romer (1987).
9An alternative approach would be to incorporate vertically diﬀerentiated inputs with foreign inputs of higher
quality to generate a positive relationship between importing and plant productivity. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl
(2006) use Hungarian plant data and ﬁnd that approximately two-thirds of the increase in plant productivity due
to importing is attributable to an increase in the variety of intermediates used in production while the remaining
one-third is due to an increase in quality. For ease of exposition and tractability, we focus on the former eﬀect.
10Thus, we are abstracting from the eﬀects of trade on the measure of intermediates produced within a country.
Our environment does, however, capture the eﬀects of trade on the measure of varieties of ﬁnal goods produced
within a country and on the measure of varieties of ﬁnal goods available to consumers in a country. We take this
approach so as to focus on the eﬀects of trade on the ﬁnal good sector and to provide estimation of the baseline
model of Melitz (2003) in Section Four. Incorporating an endogenous measure of intermediate varieties is an
interesting avenue for future work but is beyond the scope of this paper.
10In the symmetric equilibrium, inputs of all domestic intermediates will be equal so xo(j) = xo
for all j. The cost minimization problem of a ﬁnal goods producer implies that employment
of any imported variety will equal x(j) = x = τ
−γ
m xo for all j. Thus expenditure on imported
intermediates and total intermediates respectively are given by
Xm = Nτ1−γ
m xo X = (1 + Nτ1−γ
m )xo (3)
Finally, production can be written as








γ−1 > 1. We will refer to this term as a ﬁrm’s total factor productivity.11
Note that a(ϕ,1) > a(ϕ,0) so, as discussed above, a ﬁrm which imports intermediates will have
higher total factor productivity than if it does not import because of the increasing returns to
variety.
The form of preferences implies that ﬁnal goods producers will price at a constant markup
equal to σ
σ−1 over marginal cost. Hence, using the ﬁnal goods technology and recalling that all
intermediates are priced at the wage which equals one, we have the following pricing rule for










where Γ ≡ αα(1 − α)1−α. As in Melitz (2003), we also assume that there are iceberg exporting
costs for ﬁnal goods so that τx > 1 units of goods has to be shipped abroad for 1 unit to arrive
at its destination. The pricing rule for ﬁnal goods sold in the foreign market is then given by
pf(ϕ,dm) = τxph(ϕ,dm).
The total revenue of a ﬁnal good producer depends on inherent productivity and export/import




while revenue from foreign sales per country of export is given by
rf(ϕ,d) = dxτ1−σ
x rh(ϕ,dm). (6)
11Note that l is a ﬁrm’s labour input and xo+d
mNτmx is a ﬁrm’s gross input of intermediate inputs so a(ϕ,d
m)
is a residual measure of productivity.
11Hence, total revenue for a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ and export/import status d is given by
r(ϕ,d) = rh(ϕ,dm) + Nrf(ϕ,d) or
r(ϕ,d) = (1 + dxNτ1−σ
x )rh(ϕ,dm). (7)
Thus, using equations (5) and (7), we can determine revenue for a ﬁrm with productivity





where bx ≡ 1 + Nτ1−σ
x and bm ≡ λσ−1. Turning to proﬁts, we see that the pricing rule of ﬁrms
implies that proﬁts of a ﬁnal good producer with inherent productivity ϕ, export/import status





In what follows, we explore the equilibria of four economies: the closed economy and three
trading economies. Let autarkic equilibrium variables be denoted with a subscript A. We
denote equilibrium variables in the full trading equilibrium with a subscript T. Our partial
trading economy with ζ = bm = 1 is equivalent to the open economy studied by Melitz (2003)
with trade in ﬁnal goods but no trade in intermediates and we denote this economy with an X
subscript. We also consider an economy with trade in intermediate goods but no trade in ﬁnal
goods and denote this economy with an M subscript.
The equilibrium price index and aggregate revenue in economy S ∈ {A,T,X,M} are denoted
PS and RS respectively. Evaluating equations (7) and (9) at these equilibrium values allows us to
determine equilibrium revenue and proﬁt functions for a ﬁnal goods producer in each economy.
3.2 Exit, Export, and Import Decisions
3.2.1 Exit Decision
We focus on stationary equilibria in which aggregate variables remain constant over time. Each
ﬁrm’s value function in economy S ∈ {A,T,X,M} is given by the maximum of the exiting value,





















12where the second equality follows because ǫ is independently distributed over time. Now since
proﬁts are strictly increasing in ϕ, there exists a cutoﬀ productivity, ϕ∗
S such that a ﬁrm will
exit if ϕ < ϕ∗
S where ϕ∗







= 0. Using methods
similar to those employed by Melitz (2003) we can show that the cutoﬀ productivities for each
economy exist, are unique, and satisfy rS(ϕ∗
S,0,0) = σf. This also implies that the revenue of a










3.2.2 Export and Import Decisions
For the full trading economy, we now consider the export and import decisions for ﬁrms which











For convenience, we can reference ﬁrms of diﬀerent productivity levels by Φ where the depen-
dence on ϕ is understood. We refer to this variable as relative productivity. Using equations
(9) and (10), we can write proﬁts in terms of Φ:
ˆ π(Φ,d,ǫ) = bdx
x bdm
m NσΦ − F(d,ǫ).
To obtain the export and import decision rules as a function of a ﬁrm’s productivity and
ﬁxed import cost, we deﬁne the following variables. Let Φx(dm,ǫ) be implicitly deﬁned by




− 1)(fm + ǫ)
bdm
m (bx − 1)
. (11)
So a ﬁrm with import status dm, ﬁxed import cost shock ǫ, and relative productivity Φx(dm,ǫ)
will be indiﬀerent between exporting and not exporting. Similarly, we have
Φm(dx,ǫ) =
ζdx
(fm + ǫ) + dx(ζdx
− 1)fx
bdx
x (bm − 1)
(12)
where a ﬁrm with dx, ǫ, and relative productivity Φm(dx,ǫ) will be indiﬀerent between importing
and not importing. Finally, let
Φxm(ǫ) =
ζ(fx + fm + ǫ)
(bxbm − 1)
. (13)
13So a ﬁrm with ﬁxed import cost shock ǫ, and relative productivity Φxm(ǫ) will be indiﬀerent
between participating in both exporting and importing markets and not participating in either
market.
We can graph each of the variables deﬁned in equations (11)–(13) as a function of ﬁxed
import costs, fm+ǫ, to determine ﬁrms’ export and import choices. Figure 1 graphs these cutoﬀ




so active ﬁrms are those with Φ ≥
f
N. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, the space is partitioned
into four areas (with boundaries given by the dark solid lines) according to ﬁrms’ export and
import choices. Firms with relatively low productivity and low ﬁxed cost of importing will
choose to import but not export. Firms with relatively low productivity and higher ﬁxed cost of
importing will choose to neither import nor export. Firms with relatively high productivity and
high ﬁxed cost of importing will choose to export but not import. Finally, ﬁrms with relatively
high productivity will choose to both import and export.
We can also demonstrate the eﬀect of complementarities in the ﬁxed costs of importing and
exporting. Recall that a decrease in ζ represents an increase in complementarities. Examination
of equations (11)-(13) shows that a decrease in ζ will shift down and decrease the slopes of
Φm(1, ), Φx(1, ), and Φxm( ). As can be seen from Figure 2, each of these changes would serve
to increase the measure of ﬁrms choosing to both export and import and decrease the measure
of ﬁrms in each of the other three areas. The shaded area in the ﬁgure indicates the ﬁrms which
became active in both exporting and importing who were either active in only one market or in
neither market in the absence of complementarities of ﬁxed costs. This is intuitive as an increase
in the complementarities should increase the fraction of ﬁrms which choose to engage in both
activities.
3.3 Autarkic and Trading Equilibria
All variables in the stationary equilibrium for each economy can be determined once we deter-
mine the cutoﬀ variable for operation, ϕ∗
S. We now seek to characterize the equations which
determine these cutoﬀ variables.
Let νS(ϕ∗
S,d) denote the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms that have export/import status equal
to d in economy S ∈ {A,T,X,M}. Let average proﬁts within each group of ﬁrms according to
export/import status be denoted ˜ πS(ϕ∗








This equation, corresponding to the “zero cutoﬀ proﬁt condition” in Melitz (2003), provides an
equilibrium relationship between average overall proﬁt, ¯ πS, and the cutoﬀ productivity, ϕ∗
S.
The second equilibrium equation is given by the free-entry condition which guarantees that







− fe = 0. (15)
Solving these two equations (14)-(15) for the two unknowns ¯ πS and ϕ∗
S, allows us to uniquely
determine the equilibrium cutoﬀ productivity in each economy.
3.4 Eﬀects of Trade
We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects of trade on the decision to operate. Using methods similar to those
employed by Melitz (2003), we can demonstrate that either type of trade increases the cutoﬀ






T. Thus opening trade in either
ﬁnal goods or intermediates or both causes ﬁrms with lower inherent productivity to exit. In the
economy with no importing, this result is identical to that identiﬁed by Melitz (2003) where the
exportation of ﬁnal goods induces a reallocation of labour from less productive ﬁrms to more
productive ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that allowing ﬁrms to import intermediates leads to even more exit
of less productive ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd that when the economy moves from autarky to full trade, market shares are
shifted away from ﬁrms which do not engage in trade (low productivity ﬁrms) to ﬁrms which
both export and import (high productivity ﬁrms). This reallocation of market shares from
less productive to more productive ﬁrms when an economy opens for full trade increases a
productivity average measured using ﬁrms revenue shares as weights. This eﬀect was identiﬁed
by Melitz (2003) in the economy with no importing of intermediates. If the economy also opens
to intermediates imports this eﬀect is strengthened because of additional resource reallocation
and a direct increase in productivity from the use of additional intermediates.
An additional interesting result is that if the returns to importing intermediates, bm, are
large enough, then a ﬁrm which chooses to export but not import in the open economy will also
lose market share. This is because a ﬁrm which chooses to only export is at a disadvantage
relative to its domestic and foreign competitors who are importing intermediates and such a
15ﬁrm may lose market share when the economy opens to full trade. For similar reasons, when the
returns to exporting, bx, are large enough, then a ﬁrm which chooses to import but not export
in the open economy will also lose market share.
It is also easy to show that the mass of operating ﬁrms must fall when an economy opens
to either type of trade. This is similar to the ﬁndings of Melitz (2003) and is an example of a
selection eﬀect as discussed in the trade literature with increasing returns and free entry (see,
for example, Krugman, 1979). Our environment identiﬁes an additional mechanism arising from
the presence of imported intermediates that strengthens this selection eﬀect.
We are also interested in the normative eﬀects of trade and, as in Melitz (2003) use the
equilibrium aggregate price index in each equilibrium to obtain a welfare measure: WS = 1
PS. In
moving from autarky to an economy with trade in ﬁnal goods, consumer welfare is impacted by
two eﬀects. The number of varieties available to the consumer changes and aggregate produc-
tivity increases. In the trading economy with no trade in ﬁnal goods but trade in intermediates,
consumer welfare is only aﬀected by the latter eﬀect and trade in intermediates impacts posi-
tively on welfare. In the economies with trade in ﬁnal goods, the number of varieties available to
the consumer in the open economies may be higher or lower than the number of varieties avail-
able to the consumer in autarky. If the number of varieties available to the consumer is higher
in trade, then welfare is also enhanced by this eﬀect but if it falls then welfare is negatively im-
pacted. However, as in Melitz (2003), we can show the increase in welfare from the productivity
gain dominates and welfare is higher in any of the trading economies than in autarky and full
trade generates higher welfare than partial trade, i.e. WA < WX < WT and WA < WM < WT.
3.5 Restrictions on Trade in Intermediate Goods
We now brieﬂy examine the eﬀects of a restriction on the importation of intermediates on aggre-
gate productivity and export activity. We already argued above that prohibiting the importation
of intermediates will have a negative eﬀect on average productivity and welfare. We may also
interpret an increase in the transportation costs associated with shipping intermediates, τm,
as an increase in barriers to trade in those goods and can show that this would also decrease
average productivity and welfare.
Furthermore, allowing intermediate imports will allow a larger fraction of ﬁrms to enter the
export market. This is because the use of imported intermediates increases the productivity of
ﬁrms through the increasing returns to variety in production. Thus, a restriction on imports
decreases export activity and hence, import protection acts as export destruction. Figure 3
16demonstrates this eﬀect when imported intermediates are prohibited for the case where there are
no ﬁxed cost complementarities. The shaded area in that ﬁgure shows the fraction of exporting
ﬁrms which stop exporting when imports are prohibited, and, hence the export destruction
due to import protection. Of course, in the presence of ﬁxed cost complementarities, export
destruction due to restrictions on trade in intermediate goods is even more pronounced.
4 Structural Estimation
4.1 The Environment
In this section, we develop an empirical model based on the theoretical model presented in the
previous section. The empirical model retains the basic structure of the theoretical model but
extends the theoretical model in the following three dimensions.
First, we incorporate not only per-period ﬁxed costs but also one-time sunk costs associated
with exporting and importing. This is primarily motivated by empirical evidence on the existence
of sunk costs of exporting and importing.12 Furthermore, incorporating sunk costs of exporting
and importing substantially improves the model’s ability to replicate the observed transition
patterns for export and import status.
Second, as reported in Section 2, heterogeneity in export and import intensities is one of
the key features of plant-level data. Our theoretical model, however, implies no diﬀerences in
export and import intensities across ﬁrms. To explain why diﬀerent plants choose diﬀerent ex-
port/import intensities in the context of the model, we allow for heterogeneity in transportation
costs of exporting and importing.13 Incorporating heterogeneous transportation costs provides
a plausible self-selection mechanism regarding export/import decisions: plants with low trans-
portation costs self-select into exporting and importing. Our assumptions on heterogeneous
transportation costs are similar to those on heterogeneous productivity. Namely, we assume
that plant-speciﬁc transportation costs, τx and τm, are drawn upon entry and are constant after
the initial draw. Thus, a plant’s type is characterized by a vector η ≡ (ϕ,τx,τm)′ in the empirical
model.
Third, we introduce stochastic ﬁxed costs of exporting and importing and cost shocks associ-
ated with exiting. These cost shocks represent unobserved state variables that are not explicitly
12See Roberts and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (2002), and Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) for
evidence of sunks cost of exporting and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2005) for sunk costs of importing.
13Heterogeneity in export and import intensities may also be because plants diﬀer in the number of trading
partners as Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004a) ﬁnd in French data. Unfortunately, due to data limitations,
we are unable to determine with which countries a plant is trading.
17incorporated into the model’s speciﬁcation in terms of observables.14 With these shocks, the
empirical model does not have closed-form characterizations of ﬁrms’ decisions, complicating
the estimation.
Extending the framework developed by Rust (1987), we consider a nested logit dynamic
programming model in which the set of alternatives are partitioned into subsets, or nests, as







t (1)). Here, χ = 0 implies that a ﬁrm exits while χ = 1 implies that
a ﬁrm continues to operate. We assume that ǫ
χ
t is independent of alternatives and is randomly
drawn from the extreme-value distribution with scale parameter ̺χ.
If a ﬁrm decides to stay, it then draws stochastic ﬁxed costs associated with its export/import
decision. These are similar to the random ﬁxed cost of importing in the theoretical model
but here we allow for a stochastic cost for every status. We partition the set of alternative
export/import choices into two subsets: D0 ≡ {(0,0)} and D1 ≡ {(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}. The cost
shocks associated with the decision to trade or not trade, denoted by ǫD
t (D) for D ∈ {D0,D1},




t (D1))′. If a ﬁrm decides to engage in trade by choosing D = D1, it then draws
additional choice-dependent cost shocks associated with its export and import decisions. These
are denoted ǫd
t(d) for d ∈ D1 and are drawn from the extreme-value distribution with scale





A ﬁrm’s net proﬁt depends on the value of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc vector η = (ϕ,τx,τm)′ as well as





where r(η,dt)/σ is gross proﬁt while F(dt,dt−1) is the sum of the per-period ﬁxed costs and the
one-time sunk costs of exporting and importing.
The Bellman’s equations which characterize the optimization problem for an incumbent ﬁrm
14Adding these shocks is also necessary to explain certain observations in the data. For example, in the absence
of exiting cost shocks, the theoretical model predicts that all ﬁrms with productivity below the cutoﬀ level will
exit. This, however, is inconsistent with the existence of many small ﬁrms in our data.
15A nested logit model allows for richer substitution patterns across alternatives than does a standard multino-
mial logit model. See, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985).
18of type η and past export/import status dt−1 are written as follows:
V (η,dt−1) =
 
max{ǫχ(0),W(η,dt−1) + ǫχ(1)}dHχ(ǫχ), (16)
W(η,dt−1) =
 





π(η,dt−1,(0,0)) + β(1 − ξ)V (η,(0,0)), for D = D0,
   
maxd′∈D1 π(η,dt−1,d′) + β(1 − ξ)V (η,d′) + ǫd(d′)
 
dHd(ǫd) for D = D1,
(18)
where Hχ, HD, and Hd represent the cumulative distribution functions of ǫχ, ǫD, and ǫd,
respectively, and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
To clarify these modiﬁcations, we describe the timing of the shocks and the decisions of
an incumbent. At the beginning of every period, a ﬁrm with value V (η,dt−1) ﬁrst draws the
idiosyncratic cost shocks associated with exiting decisions, ǫχ, and decides whether to exit or
continue to operate. If the ﬁrm decides to exit, it receives the terminal value of ǫχ(0). If the
ﬁrm decides to operate with the continuation value of W(η,dt−1), it then draws the cost shocks
associated with trading decisions, ǫD, and decides whether it will engage in trading activities.
This trading decision is described in the right hand side of equation (17), where J(η,dt−1,D)
denotes the continuation value under a trading choice D ∈ {D0,D1}. If the ﬁrm decides to
trade, it draws the cost shocks associated with exporting and importing, ǫd, and makes export
and import decisions. The ﬁrm then faces a possibility of a large negative shock that causes it
to exit with probability ξ. If the ﬁrm remains in the market, production and trading occurs.
With the solution to the functional equations (16)-(18), and using the properties of the
extreme-value distributed random variables (see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985),
the conditional choice probabilities of exiting and export/import decisions are derived as follows.
First, taking into account the exogenous exiting probability of ξ, the probabilities of staying
(χt = 1) and exiting (χt = 0) are given by:




and P(χt = 0|η,dt−1) = 1 − P(χt = 1|η,dt−1). Conditional on χ = 1 (i.e., continuing to
operate), the choice probabilities of d ∈ {0,1}2 are given by:




P(D0|η,dt−1,χ = 1) for dt ∈ D0,
P(D1|η,dt−1,χ = 1)P(dt|η,dt−1,χ = 1,D = D1), for dt ∈ D1,
(20)
19where





P(dt|η,dt−1,χ = 1,D = D1) =
exp([π(η,dt−1,dt) + β(1 − ξ)V (η,dt)]/̺d)
 
d′∈D1 exp([π(η,dt−1,d′) + β(1 − ξ)V (η,d′)]/̺d)
.
These choice probabilities follow the familiar nested logit formula (c.f., McFadden, 1978).16
We assume that the logarithm of plant-speciﬁc productivity, lnϕ, is drawn upon entry from
N(0,σ2
ϕ). Regarding, the plant-speciﬁc transportation costs, we deﬁne the following functions
for notational convenience:
zx ≡ ln(Nτ1−σ
x ), zm ≡ ln(Nτ1−γ
m ). (21)
We assume that, conditional on lnϕ, the random variables zx and zm are independent of each
other and are drawn at the time of entry from normal distributions with the means  x and  m
and variances σ2
x and σ2
m, respectively. We denote the density function of η = (ϕ,τx,τm) at the
initial draw by gη(η).
We focus on a stationary equilibrium in which the joint distribution of (η,d) is constant over
time. In such an equilibrium, free entry implies that the expected value of an entering ﬁrm must
equal the ﬁxed entry cost fe:
 
V (η,dt−1 = (0,0))gη(η)dη = fe, (22)
where V (.) is given by equation (16).
We denote the stationary distribution of (η,d) among incumbents by  ∗(η,d). Stationarity
requires that the number of exiting ﬁrms equals the number of successful new entrants so that
M
   
d′∈D
P(χ = 0|η′,d′) ∗(η′,d′)dη′




P(χ = 1|η,dt−1 = (0,0))gη(η′)dη′
      
entrants
, (23)
16There are important diﬀerences, however, between static nested logit models and the dynamic model we
consider here. First, in static models, the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds within
each nest but the IIA property no longer holds even within a nest in dynamic models because the continuation
value depends on the attributes of other alternatives outside of the nest (c.f., Rust, 1994). Second, while a static
model typically has a closed-form speciﬁcation in parameters (e.g., linear-in-parameters), the conditional choice
probabilities (19)-(20) do not have a closed-form expression in parameters; instead, their evaluations require the
solution to the functional equations (16)-(18). It is computationally intensive, therefore, to evaluate the conditional
choice probabilities in our dynamic model although the extreme-value speciﬁcation substantially simpliﬁes the
computation by avoiding the need for multi-dimensional numerical integrations in (16)-(18).
20where M is a total mass of incumbents and Me is a total mass of ﬁrms that attempt to enter
into the market.
Now the evolution of the probability measure among incumbents has to take account of both
the transition of states among survivors and entry/exit processes. The probability that a ﬁrm
with state (η,dt−1) continues in operation at t with state dt is given by:
P(dt,χt = 1|η,dt−1) = P(dt|η,dt−1,χt = 1)P(χt = 1|η,dt−1).
In the stationarity equilibrium, the measure of ﬁrms with state (η,d) does not change over time:
M ∗(η,d) = M
 
d′∈D
P(d,χ = 1|η,d′) ∗(η,d′)+MeP(d,χ = 1|η,dt−1 = (0,0))gη(η) for all (η,d).
(24)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the measure of survivors from the last period with state
(η,d) while the second term represents the measure of new entrants with state (η,d). Note
that new entrants have no past export/import experience so dt−1 = (0,0) for those plants. The
stationary distribution is numerically computed as the ﬁxed point of (24) under the restriction
of (23).
4.2 The Likelihood Function
Total revenue, export intensity, and import intensity are assumed to be measured with error.
We also allow for labor augmented technological change at an annual rate of αt. Modifying the
revenue functions and the intermediate demand functions to include measurement error and a
time trend, we use equations (3), (6), and (7) to specify the logarithm of observed total revenue,
export intensity, and import intensity as:
lnrit = α0 + αtt + ln[1 + exp(zx,i)]dx
it + αm ln[1 + exp(zm,i)]dm
it + lnϕi + ω1,it, (25)
lnNr
f
it/rit = ln[exp(zx,i)/(1 + exp(zx,i))] + ω2,it, if dx
it = 1, (26)
lnXm
it /Xit = αm ln[exp(zm,i)/(1 + exp(zm,i)] + ω3,it, if dm
it = 1. (27)
Here Nr
f
it/rit is the observed ratio of export revenue to total revenue; Xm
it /Xit is the observed
ratio of imported intermediate costs to total intermediate costs; and ω1,it, ω2,it, and ω3,it are
measurement errors in total revenue, export intensity, and import intensity, respectively. We as-
sume that, conditional on (ηi,dx
it,dm
it), ωit ≡ (ω1,it,ω2,it,ω3,it)′ is randomly drawn from N(0,Σω)
and we denote its probability density function by gω( ). We reparametrize Σω using the unique
21lower triangular Cholesky decomposition as Σω = ΛωΛ′
ω and denote the (j,k)-th component of
Λω by λj,k. In the appendix, we derive the conditional density function for observed components
of ωit conditional on dit and denote it by gω(ωit|dit).
Given these speciﬁcations for revenue, (detrended) ﬁrm’s net proﬁt may be expressed in






r(ηi,dit) = exp(α0 + ln[1 + exp(zx,i)]dx
it + αm ln[1 + exp(zm,i)]dm
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f + ζ[fx + fm + cx(1 − dx




Here f is the per-period cost of operating in the market while fx and fm are per-period ﬁxed
cost of exporting and importing, respectively. The parameter cx represents the sunk cost of
exporting for a non-exporting plant to start exporting while the parameter cm represents the
sunk cost of importing. The parameter ζ captures the degree of ﬁxed cost complementarity
between exporting and importing.
Denote the parameter vector to be estimated by
θ = (α0,αt,f,fx,fm,cx,cm,αm,ξ,̺χ,̺D,̺d,σϕ, x, m,σx,σm,λ11,λ21,λ22,λ31,λ32,λ33)′.
We estimate this vector by the method of maximum likelihood.18
Let Ti,0 be the ﬁrst year in which ﬁrm i appears in the data. Conditioning on ηi, the
17We consider a “detrended” version of ﬁrm’s problem by using the trend-adjusted discount factor β exp(αt) in
place of the discount factor β in solving the Bellman’s equation.
18The discount factor β is not estimated but is set to 0.95. It is diﬃcult to identify the discount factor in
dynamic discrete choice models (cf., Rust, 1987).





Pθ(χit = 0|ηi,di,t−1) for χit = 0,
Pθ(χit = 1|ηi,di,t−1)
      
Staying
Pθ(dit|ηi,di,t−1,χit = 1)
      
Export/Import
gω(˜ ωit(ηi)|dit)
      
Revenue/Intensity
for χit = 1,
where gω(˜ ωit(ηi)|dit) is the likelihood contribution from the observations of revenues, export
intensity, and import intensity (see the appendix). Note that in estimating the revenue function
given by (25), the endogeneity of export/import decisions as well as the sample selection due
to endogenous exiting decisions are dealt with by simultaneously considering the likelihood
contribution from export/import/exiting decisions.
For the initial period of t = Ti,0, we observe a plant that decided to stay in the market so
that the likelihood is conditioned on χit = 1,
Lit(θ|ηi,di,t−1) = Pθ(dit|ηi,di,t−1,χit = 1)gω(˜ ωit(ηi)|dit).





where Ti,0 is the initial year in which ﬁrm i is observed while Ti,1 is the last year in which ﬁrm
i appears in the data.
Evaluation of the likelihood function requires computing the likelihood contribution from
initial observation di,Ti,0 while taking into account of its correlation with unobserved plant
heterogeneity (cf., Heckman (1981)). The joint distribution of (ηi,di,Ti,0), crucially depends on
whether a plant is observed in the initial sample period or not. If plant i is observed in the initial
sample period, we assume that (ηi,di,Ti,0) is drawn from the stationary distribution  ∗(η,d). On
the other hand, if plant i enters into the sample after the initial sample period, we use the
distribution of initial draws upon successful entry given by
ge(η) =
P(χ = 1|η,dt−1 = (0,0))  
P(χ = 1|η′,dt−1 = (0,0))gη(η′)dη′gη(η)
together with the choice probability function (20) to evaluate the likelihood. Then, the likelihood






Li(θ|η′,di,Ti,0) ∗(η′,di,Ti,0)dη′ for Ti,0 = 1990,
 
Li(θ|η′,di,Ti,0)Pθ(di,Ti,0|η′,di,Ti,0−1 = (0,0))ge(η′)dη′ for Ti,0 > 1990.





Evaluation of the log-likelihood involves solving the dynamic programming problem that
approximates the Bellman equations (16)-(18) by discretization of state space. For each can-
didate parameter vector θ, we solve the discretized version of (16)-(18) and then obtain the
choice probabilities, (19) and (20), as well as the stationary distribution from the associated
policy function. Once the choice probabilities and the stationary distribution are obtained for a
particular candidate parameter vector θ, we may then evaluate the log-likelihood function (30).
Repeating this process, we can maximize (30) over the parameter space of θ to determine the
estimate.
4.3 Reduced-form vs. Structural Parameters
It is important to note that equations (25)-(27) are reduced-form speciﬁcations. In particular, we
have the following relationships between reduced-form parameters and structural parameters:19
α0 = ln
 
(Γ(σ − 1)/σ)σ−1RPσ−1 
, (31)
αm =
(σ − 1)(1 − α)
γ − 1
. (32)
Since α0 and αm are not structural parameters, they could be aﬀected by policy changes. In
particular, any policy change that aﬀects the aggregate price P will lead to a change in α0.
Identifying such a relationship is especially important in conducting counterfactual experiments
below which quantify the impact of a change in trade policy on welfare and aggregate produc-
tivity. Counterfactual policy experiments in this paper explicitly take into account equilibrium
price responses using our knowledge of the relationship between the reduced-form parameter α0
and the aggregate price P.
19Also, with abuse of notation, we replace (σ−1)lnϕ by lnϕ since (σ−1) cannot be separately identiﬁed from
the variance of lnϕ.
244.4 Identiﬁcation
For simplicity, suppose that the time-dimension is long enough to identify the values of plant-
speciﬁc productivity ϕ as well as plant-speciﬁc transportation costs, τx and τm, for each plant
from plant-level observations using (25)-(27). In practice, the time-dimension is short but,
under the distributional assumption on η = (ϕ,τx,τm), we may identify each plant’s likelihood
of having a particular value of η.
Once plant-speciﬁc transportation costs are identiﬁed, it is straightforward to identify the
parameters in the revenue function (25). For instance, we may consider the moment restriction
E[ω1,it−ω1,i(t−1)|dx
i ,dm
i ] = 0 obtained from taking ﬁrst diﬀerences in (25) using the within-plant
variations in export and import status as well as the cross-plant variations in transportation
costs. Note that we observe a substantial number of plants who switch their export and import
status as discussed in the data section.
Variations in the data may be associated with the identiﬁcation of diﬀerent cost parameters
as follows. Sunk costs of exporting is identiﬁed by diﬀerences in exporting frequencies across
plants that have similar plant-characteristics (captured by plant-speciﬁc productivity and trans-
portation costs) but diﬀer in their past exporting status. Per-period ﬁxed cost of exporting is
identiﬁed from the frequency that exporters become non-exporters. Similarly, sunk cost and
per-period ﬁxed cost of importing may be identiﬁed from the corresponding frequencies of im-
porting. The ﬁxed cost complementarity parameter is identiﬁed by comparing the frequencies
of exporting among non-importers with the frequencies of exporting among importers across
plants with similar future revenue prospects. Finally, the ﬁxed cost of operating is identiﬁed
from the frequencies of exiting across plants with similar plant-characteristics.20
We may identify the parameters for the distribution of plant-speciﬁc productivities and
export/import intensities at the time of entry using the variation in productivities and ex-
port/import intensities among new entrants. As we discuss in Section 4.6, there are a substantial
number of new entrants every year.
In discrete choice models, the scale of the proﬁt function cannot be identiﬁed because multi-
plying the proﬁt function of each alternative by a positive constant does not change the optimal
choice. For identiﬁcation, we normalize the proﬁt function given by (29).21 This implies that
20Furthermore, the scale parameters for exiting cost shocks are identiﬁed (separately from the ﬁxed cost of
operating) by diﬀerences in exiting frequencies across plants with diﬀerent plant-characteristics. Similarly, the
scale parameters for exporting and importing cost shocks are identiﬁed by diﬀerences in exporting and importing
frequencies across plants with diﬀerent plant-characteristics.




25we cannot identify the elasticity of substitution, σ, in the discrete choice model. Furthermore,
as shown in (32), we cannot identify α and γ because they are incorporated in the reduced-form
parameter αm. This is problematic because the knowledge of σ and γ is often required to in-
terpret the estimates as well as the results from counterfactual experiments. Hence, we use the
inverse of the average markup rate across plants within 4-digit ISIC industries as our estimate
of the elasticity of substitution σ. To obtain an estimate of γ, we ﬁrst compute the average
material shares in variable costs as our estimate of α and then derive an estimate of γ using
equation (32).
4.5 The Data
Our data set is based on the Chilean manufacturing census for 1990-1996 which covers all plants
with at least 10 employees.22 The original data set is available from 1979 to 1996 but the
value of export sales is reported only after 1990 and, thus, we exclude the period before 1990.
We estimate the structural parameters separately for three manufacturing industries at the 4-
digit level (ISIC code): Wearing Apparel (3220), Plastic Products (3560), and Structural Metal
(3813-3815). We chose these three industries because they are relatively large in sample size and
include many plants that export and/or import. Furthermore, a substantial number of plants
change their export/import status in these industries over this time period. For instance, among
535 plants in Wearing Apparel industry, 141 plants (26.4%) switch their export/import status
over the period at least once, and among those, 81 plants (15.1%) change their export/import
status more than once.23 As discussed above, this within-plant variation in export/import status
provides an important source of identiﬁcation of export/import cost parameters.






where i represents plant’s identiﬁcation and t indicates the year. The entry/exiting decisions, χit,
can be identiﬁed in the data by looking at the number of workers across years. We use total sales
for rit, where the 4-digit industry level output price deﬂater is used to convert nominal quantities
into real terms. Export intensity Nr
f
it/rit is measured by the ratio of export sales to total sales.
σf, σfx, and σfm rather than ̺
χ, ̺
D, ̺
d, f, fx, and fx.
22A detailed description of the data as well as Chilean industry trade orientation up to 1986 is found in Liu
(1993), Tybout (1996), and Pavcnik (2002). A unit of observation in our sample is a plant not a ﬁrm. This
is due to limitations of our data set. Unfortunately, we are unable to capture the extent to which multi-plant
ﬁrms make joint decisions on exporting and importing across diﬀerent plants they own. Neither are we able to
examine whether or not a plant belongs to multinational ﬁrm although exporting and importing by multinational
ﬁrms are important topics (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004; Yi, 2003). Pavcnik (2002) reports that over 90 percent of
manufacturing ﬁrms had only one plant for 1979-1986.
23Among 369 plants in the Plastic Products industry, 24% change their export/import status more than once
over the sample period. Of the 326 plants in Structural Metals, 13% switch their status more than once.
26Table 5: Descriptive Statistics in 1990
Total Intermediate Labour Export Imported Export Import Markup
Salesa Inputsa Salesa,b Inputsa,b Intensityb Intensityb Ratec
Wearing Apparel 1.33 0.83 73.1 0.96 0.52 0.21 0.28 0.23
(3.62) (2.47) (155.8) (1.71) (0.90) (0.32) (0.26) (0.18)
Plastic Products 2.76 1.71 73.6 0.19 1.29 0.05 0.35 0.26
(5.50) (3.86) (81.3) (0.36) (2.18) (0.10) (0.23) (0.22)
Structural Metals 3.60 2.18 90.3 0.79 2.42 0.12 0.38 0.24
(7.72) (4.67) (118.1) (1.11) (4.25) (0.17) (0.28) (0.19)
Notes: Reported numbers are sample means (standard deviations in parentheses). (a) in units of millions of US dollars
in 1990. (b) computed using the sample of exporting (importing) plants for export (import) intensity. (c) is computed as
(revenue - variable cost)/revenue using the data for 1990-1996.
Our measurement of intermediate inputs, Xit, include materials, fuels, and electricity while we
use the reported value of imported materials for Xm
it . Accordingly, import intensity Xm
it /Xit
is measured by the ratio of imported materials to total intermediate costs. The export/import
status, (dx
it,dm
it), is identiﬁed from the data by checking if the value of export sales and/or the
value of imported materials are zero or positive.
Descriptive statistics from the sample data in 1990 are provided in Table 5. Examining the
standard deviations for total sales and various inputs, we note that the production scale varies
substantially across plants. Export and import intensities also diﬀer across trading plants. The
average markup rate—computed as revenue minus variable cost divided by revenue—range from
0.23 to 0.26.24 There are also substantial plant turnovers every year for these industries (not
reported in the table). For example, in Wearing Apparel, on average, 37 plants enter into the
market every year while 30 plants exit from the market. Having a number of entrants and exiting
plants in the sample is important for identifying the parameters determining the exiting choice
probabilities as well as the distribution of initial productivity draws.
4.6 Estimation Results
Table 6 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the empirical models for each industry.
The table also reports their asymptotic standard errors, which are computed using the outer
product of gradients estimator. The parameters are evaluated in units of millions of US dollars
in 1990.
The estimated elasticity of substitution across diﬀerentiated ﬁnal products, σ, ranges from
3.80 for plastic products to 4.41 for wearing apparel while our estimate for the elasticity of
24We measure “variable cost” by the sum of costs of materials, fuels, and electricity.
27Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Wearing Apparel Plastic Products Structural Metal
α0 -0.870 (0.016) -0.731 (0.023) -0.359 (0.024)
σf 0.114 (0.033) 0.400 (0.049) 0.181 (0.014)
σfx 0.364 (0.086) 0.266 (0.041) 0.550 (0.104)
σfm 0.240 (0.058) 0.202 (0.042) 0.385 (0.079)
σcx 3.275 (0.660) 3.013 (0.507) 3.811 (0.839)
σcm 2.724 (0.513) 1.755 (0.313) 2.800 (0.599)
σρ
D 0.735 (0.136) 0.629 (0.110) 0.774 (0.156)
σ̺
d 0.814 (0.175) 0.761 (0.107) 0.955 (0.185)
σρ
χ 0.849 (0.325) 1.918 (0.456) 0.233 (0.057)
αt 0.066 (0.002) 0.173 (0.003) 0.125 (0.003)
ξ 0.082 (0.007) 0.047 (0.007) 0.054 (0.006)
αm 0.623 (0.048) 0.579 (0.039) 0.658 (0.043)
λ11 0.297 (0.002) 0.311 (0.004) 0.326 (0.002)
λ22 1.333 (0.057) 1.396 (0.036) 1.144 (0.052)
λ21 -0.127 (0.128) 0.010 (0.091) -0.273 (0.142)
λ33 0.689 (0.016) 0.580 (0.006) 0.700 (0.018)
λ32 0.057 (0.066) 0.048 (0.046) -0.044 (0.069)
λ31 -0.107 (0.049) 0.048 (0.025) 0.087 (0.040)
σϕ 1.307 (0.052) 1.326 (0.063) 1.503 (0.072)
 x -3.802 (0.326) -4.253 (0.252) -4.243 (0.244)
 m -2.926 (0.290) -2.471 (0.250) -3.075 (0.303)
σx 1.361 (0.193) 1.309 (0.142) 1.313 (0.176)
σm 1.476 (0.135) 1.830 (0.157) 1.656 (0.179)
ζ 0.800 (0.034) 0.805 (0.039) 0.791 (0.058)
σfe 20.495 23.725 44.621
σ = 1/markup
a 4.409 3.802 4.253
γ = (σ − 1)(1 − α)/αm + 1
b 5.064 4.561 4.600
log-likelihood 4587.21 4423.66 3478.31
No. of Plants 534 369 392
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The parameters are evaluated units of millions of US dollars in 1990. a).
“markup” is computed as the mean of (revenue-variable cost)/revenue. b). The value of (1 − α) is computed as the mean
of the material share in total variable cost.
substitution across diﬀerentiated intermediate products, γ, ranges from 4.56 to 5.06.25 In the
following, we use these estimates to interpret our estimation results although it is possible to
reinterpret our results under diﬀerent values of σ and γ.
4.6.1 Sunk and Fixed Costs
Our approach allows us to quantify the magnitude of sunk and ﬁxed costs of exporting and
importing. The average sunk cost of exporting ranges from 743 thousand 1990 US dollars for
25Our estimates for the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerentiated intermediate products are in line with
those found by Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile (1992) and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2006). For instance, the
latter study ﬁnds that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign intermediate goods is 5.4.
28wearing apparel to 896 thousand US dollars for structural metals.26 The sunk costs of importing
range from 462 thousand 1990 US dollars for plastic products to 658 thousand US dollars for
structural metals. Thus, both exporting and importing requires high start-up costs, which
may arise because to begin importing requires establishing a network with foreign suppliers,
learning government regulations or implementing new materials. It is important to note that
the exporting and importing costs actually incurred are lower than these estimates since plants
start exporting and/or importing when they get lower cost shocks. Furthermore, as we discuss
below, plants that both export and import pay considerably less of the sunk costs because of
the cost complementarity.
The ﬁxed costs of exporting range from 70 to 129 thousand US dollars while the ﬁxed costs of
importing range from 53 to 91 thousand US dollars, indicating that both exporters and importers
also pay substantial per-period ﬁxed costs to continue to export and import. The parameter
determining the degree of complementarity in exporting and importing sunk and ﬁxed costs,
ζ, ranges from 0.79 to 0.81, indicating that a ﬁrm can save approximately 20 percent of the
per-period ﬁxed costs and sunk costs associated with trade by simultaneously engaging in both
export and import activities. Thus, the estimated total ﬁxed costs of trading for a plant that
both exports and imports ranges from 99 thousand 1990 US dollars for Plastic Products to 174
thousand 1990 US dollars for Structural Metals.
4.6.2 Importing and Exporting
The estimates of αm,  x,  m, σx, and σm indicate that the eﬀects of exporting and importing
on total revenue diﬀer across plants but, on average, their impact is large. For instance, for
the “average” plant with zx = −3.80 and zm = −2.93 in Wearing Apparel, exporting has a
substantial impact of a 2.2% (=ln(1 + exp(zx))%) increase on total revenues while importing
materials from abroad increases total revenue by a 3.3% (=αm ln(1+exp(zm))%). Furthermore,
the estimates of σx and σm suggest substantial heterogeneity in gains from exporting and im-
porting. Note that since plants with larger gains from exporting and importing are more likely to
self-select into those activities, the average revenue gains from exporting and importing among
actual exporters and importers is even larger than the gain for the “average” plant.
26To the best of our knowledge, the only previous study that estimates the magnitude of sunk costs of exporting
is Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) while there is no previous study that estimates importing sunk costs. Despite
using diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations and looking at diﬀerent countries and industries, our estimates of exporting
sunk costs are similar in magnitude, although larger, to the estimates of Das, Roberts, and Tybout, especially
given our relatively large standard errors. Their estimates range from 344 thousand 1986 US dollars to 430
thousand 1986 US dollars for leather products, basic chemicals, and knitted fabrics industries in Columbia.
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Figure 4: Export and Import Intensities (Actual vs. Predicted)
Figure 4 compares the actual and predicted distribution of export and import intensities.
In the top panels, the solid line indicates the actual export intensities while the dashed line
indicates the predicted export intensities. The empirical models quantitatively replicate the
observed pattern of export intensities, including the fact that a majority of exporters export
less than 5 percent of their output for all three industries. The ﬁgure also plots the distribution
of latent export intensities among non-exporters if they had exported. The distribution of non-
exporters (dotted line) is skewed left relative to that of exporters (dashed line). This is because,
in the model, plants with lower transportation costs are more likely to export than plants with
higher transportation costs. Similarly, in the bottom panels, the estimated model replicates the
distribution of import intensities well and the predicted import intensities among non-importers
tend to be lower than those among importers.27
Table 7 shows that exports and imports are highly concentrated in the data and that the
estimated model performs reasonably well in capturing the observed high degree of trade con-
centration. For instance, in Wearing Apparel, the top 5 percent of exporting (importing) plants
account for 55.4 (35.1) percent of total exports (imports) in the actual data, while the prediction
27The predicted distribution of import intensities is hump-shaped while the actual distribution is not. This is
because we assume that transportation costs are normally distributed.
30Table 7: Export and Import Concentration (Actual vs. Predicted)
Wearing Apparel Plastic Products Structural Metal
Export % of Total Exports % of Total Exports % of Total Exports
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Top 5% 55.43 42.45 46.79 40.34 29.16 38.46
Top 10% 71.03 57.37 64.46 54.42 45.27 51.37
Wearing Apparel Plastic Products Structural Metal
Import % of Total Imports % of Total Imports % of Total Imports
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Top 5% 35.13 33.95 38.58 35.10 36.63 39.30
Top 10% 54.70 43.25 57.63 44.32 51.49 48.94
of the empirical model is 42.5 (34.0) percent.28
4.6.3 Productivity
In the model, plants with higher productivity are more likely to survive than lower productivity
plants. Figure 5 shows the importance of such a selection mechanism. In the top panels, the ac-
tual productivity distribution among incumbents (solid line) is skewed right relative to the actual
productivity distribution among new entrants.29 The bottom panels show that the empirical
models qualitatively capture the observed diﬀerence in the productivity distributions between
incumbents and new entrants.30 In Table 8, the predicted average productivity advantage of
incumbents relative to that of plants attempting to enter ranges from 15 percent in Wearing
Apparel to 56 percent for Structural Metal, indicating that the selection through endogenous
exiting may play an important role in determining aggregate productivity.
Exporters and importers tend to have higher productivities than domestic plants that do
not engage in any trading activities because higher productivity plants are more likely to export
and import. This is shown in Figure 6. In the top panels, the actual productivity distributions
among plants that export, plants that import and plants that do both are skewed right relative
to the actual distribution among plants that do neither. As the bottom panels show, the
estimated models replicate the basic patterns of the diﬀerences in productivity distributions
28In our preliminary investigation, we estimated a model without heterogeneity in transportation costs and
found that the degree of trade concentration predicted by the model without heterogeneous transportation costs
is far less than observed. Hence, heterogeneity in transportation costs is crucial to quantitatively explain the
heavy concentration of exports and imports among a small number of plants in our data.
29To construct the actual productivity distribution, we ﬁrst compute a revenue residual, lnφi + ω1,it, for each
plant-time observation as our measure of “actual productivity,” and then plot a histogram of these residuals.
30The numbers used to construct Figures 4-6 as well as those reported in Tables 8-10 are directly computed
using the approximated distribution function rather than simulating the data from the estimated models. The
approximation methods are presented in a supplementary appendix which is available upon request.














































































































































































Figure 5: Productivity Distribution of Incumbents and New Entrants (Actual vs. Predicted)
Table 8: Mean of Predicted Productivity
Wearing Apparel Plastic Products Structural Metals
Mean of ϕ at Entry Trial 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mean of ϕ among Incumbents 1.149 1.556 1.163
Mean of ϕ among Importers 2.047 2.136 2.591
Mean of ϕ among Exporters 2.644 2.778 4.061
Mean of ϕ among Ex/Importers 3.459 3.188 5.075
Notes: The reported numbers are relative to the productivity level at entry in the estimated model. In particular, the
original numbers are divided by the mean of ϕ at entry (i.e.,
R
ϕgϕ(ϕ)dϕ). “Exporters” are plants that export while
“Importers” are plants that import. “Ex/Importers” represent plants that both export and import.
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Figure 6: Productivity Distribution of Domestic Plants, Exporters, and Importers (Actual vs.
Predicted)
across plants with diﬀerent trading status. As reported in the last three rows of Table 8, the
average productivity advantage of exporters and importers relative to the average incumbent is
large, ranging from 37 percent for importers in Plastic Products to 436 percent for exporters in
Structural Metals. The table also demonstrates that plants that both export and import are
even more productive on average.
4.6.4 Dynamics
Table 9 compares actual and predicted transition probabilities of export/import status condi-
tional on not exiting from the market for the Structural Metal industry. The table also reports
the distribution for entrants as well as the steady state distribution of plants according to ex-
port/import status. The results from the other two industries are similar and are presented
in the appendix. In the data, export/import status is quite persistent. For instance, the fre-
quency that plants that neither export nor import will not engage in any trading activities next
period is 92.7 percent. The estimated models are able to replicate the observed persistence in
export/import status as well as new entrant’s distribution and the steady state distribution of
33Table 9: Transition of Export/Import Status for Structural Metal (Actual vs. Predicted)
(1) No-Export (2) Export (3) No-Export (4) Export
/No-Import /No-Import /Import /Import
Actual
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.927 0.018 0.050 0.006
Export/No-Import at t 0.265 0.367 0.000 0.367
No-Export/Import at t 0.170 0.009 0.740 0.081
Export/Import at t 0.043 0.101 0.101 0.754
New Entrants 0.877 0.012 0.099 0.012
Steady State Distribution 0.735 0.032 0.144 0.089
Predicted
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.928 0.014 0.050 0.008
Export/No-Import at t 0.242 0.564 0.028 0.166
No-Export/Import at t 0.223 0.007 0.697 0.073
Export/Import at t 0.035 0.119 0.166 0.680
New Entrants 0.879 0.019 0.077 0.025
Steady State Distribution 0.742 0.041 0.150 0.067
export/import status reasonably well.31
4.7 Counterfactual Experiments
We now present the results of a series of counterfactual experiments which examine the eﬀect
of trade barriers on trading activity, productivity, and welfare. To determine the full impact
of a counterfactual experiment, it is crucial to compute how the equilibrium aggregate price
changes as a result of the experiment. This can be done by ﬁnding a new equilibrium aggregate
price at which the free entry condition (22) holds in the experiment. The appendix provides a
detailed description of how we compute the equilibrium aggregate price under a counterfactual
experiment. There it is shown that we may identify the logarithm of the equilibrium price
change up to the parameter (σ − 1).
To quantitatively investigate the impact of trade barriers and export/import complemen-
tarities, we conduct the following six counterfactual experiments: (1) Autarky (fx,fm → ∞);
(2) No Trade in Final Goods (fx → ∞); (3) No Trade in Intermediates (fm → ∞); (4) No
Complementarity in Fixed Trading Costs (ζ = 1); (5) The transportation cost of exporting, τx,
increases by 10%; and (6) The transportation cost of importing, τm, increases by 10%.
Note that we can investigate the impact of the counterfactual experiments on welfare by
31The empirical models generate the observed persistence in export/import status for the following reasons.
First, the presence of sunk costs of exporting and importing generates “true state dependence” in export/import
decisions. Second, unobserved heterogeneity may lead to “spurious state dependence” even without sunk costs
because, for instance, highly productive plants are likely to keep exporting while less productive plants do not
export. When we estimated a model without sunk costs, the model could not replicate the observed high degree
of persistence in export/import status. Thus, it is important to incorporate sunk costs to capture the observed
persistence in export/import status.
34Table 10: Counterfactual Experiments for Structural Metal
Counterfactual Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Autarky No Trade in No Trade in No 10% inc. 10% inc.
Trade Final Goods Intermediates Complement. in τx in τm
∆lnP 0.000 0.030 0.008 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.006
∆ ln(Average ϕ) 0.000 -0.027 -0.012 -0.011 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
∆ ln(Average TFP) 0.000 -0.180 -0.012 -0.163 0.003 -0.002 -0.050
A Fraction of Exporters 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.063 0.099 0.104
A Fraction of Importers 0.216 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.180 0.214 0.195
Aggregate Exports 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.765 0.872 0.743 0.960
Aggregate Imports 1.000 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.960 0.989 0.753
examining the aggregate price response. This is so because the aggregate price is inversely
related to welfare.32
Table 10 presents the results of the counterfactual experiments using the estimated model
for one industry, Structural Metals. The appendix provides results for the other two industries.
According to these experiments, moving from autarky to trade decreases the equilibrium ag-
gregate price by 3.0 percent. This implies that exposure to full trade increases real income by
3.0 percent, leading to a substantial increase in welfare. This positive welfare eﬀect occurs be-
cause under trade, more productive ﬁrms start exporting and importing, which in turn increases
aggregate labor demand and the real wage.
The impact of trade on aggregate productivity–measured by a productivity average using the
plants’ market shares as weights—can be understood by comparing “ln(Average ϕ) at Steady
State” between trade and autarky. Moving from trade to autarky leads to a 2.7% decrease in this
measure of aggregate productivity at the steady state. Once we take into account the additional
productivity eﬀect from importing, however, the impact of trade on total factor productivity
(TFP) is much larger at 18.0 percent, indicating that most of TFP eﬀect of trade is induced by
importing intermediates.
The counterfactual experiments under no trade in ﬁnal goods or no trade in intermediates
(but not both) highlight the interaction between exporting and importing in the presence of
heterogeneous ﬁrms. According to the estimated model, when the economy moves from full
trade to no trade in ﬁnal goods, the fraction of importers declines from a 21.6% to 16.9% and
aggregate imports fall by 6.6%. Similarly, when the economy moves from full trade to no trade
in intermediates, the fraction of exporters declines from a 10.8% to 4.5% and aggregate exports
32Recall that aggregate income is constant at the level of L. From the budget constraint PQ = L we have that
aggregate utility is given by U = Q = P
−1L.
35fall by 23.5%. Thus, policies that prohibit the import of foreign materials could have a large
negative impact on the export of ﬁnal consumption goods – that is, import protection can lead
to export destruction.
To examine the role of complementarities between export and import ﬁxed and sunk costs
relative to the role played by the complementarities in the revenue function, we conducted an
experiment to determine what would happen to the fraction of importers and the fraction of
exporters if there was no complementarity between export and import in the ﬁxed and sunk cost
function. As the table demonstrates, eliminating the cost complementarity lowers the fraction of
exporters and importers as well as aggregate exports and imports, as expected, but the impact
is less than under trade restrictions. These results suggest that both forms of complementarities
are present.
We conduct additional (less extreme) experiments to examine what would happen to welfare
and productivity if the transportation cost parameters, τx and τm, were 10 percent higher than
the actual estimates. The results are presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 10. Note that a
10 percent increase in transportation costs of either form have a relatively small impact on the
fraction of exporters and importers but a substantial impact on aggregate exports and imports.
This implies that the impact of an increase in transportation costs on aggregate exports and
imports operates mainly through the intensive margin rather than through the extensive margin.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007).
As the appendix demonstrates we ﬁnd similar results for the other two industries in our
study so here we brieﬂy summarize the results of the counterfactual experiments. We ﬁnd that
trade barriers have a substantial negative eﬀect on aggregate welfare and aggregate productivity.
Furthermore, there are signiﬁcant revenue and cost complementarities between the exportation
of ﬁnal goods and the importation of intermediate goods. Thus, policies which restrict imports
of intermediates harm exporters of ﬁnal goods and restricting exports of those goods decreases
the ability of ﬁrms to use productivity-enhancing imported intermediates.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
We have developed and estimated a stochastic industry model of importing and exporting with
heterogeneous ﬁrms. The analysis highlights interactions between imports of intermediate goods
and exports of ﬁnal goods. In doing so, we have identiﬁed a potential mechanism whereby import
policy can aﬀect exports and export policy can aﬀect imports.
36Our model has a simple parsimonious structure and, yet, is able to replicate the basic features
of the plant-level data. To maintain its parsimony, and also because of data limitations and
computational complexity, the model ignores several important features. We do not address the
important issue of how multi-plant and multinational ﬁrms make joint decisions on exporting and
importing across diﬀerent plants. We also ignore plant capital investment decisions. Finally, we
do not allow adjustment in the measure of varieties of intermediates produced within a country
in response to changes in the trading environment. These features could be incorporated into
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A.1 Estimation of the Density Function
Conditioning on ϕi, we may compute the estimate of ωit = (ω1,it,ω2,it,ω3,it)′ from (25)-(27) as
˜ ω1,it(ηi) = lnrit − α0 − αt − ln[1 + exp(zx,i)]dx
it − αm ln[1 + exp(zm,i)]dm
it − lnϕi,
˜ ω2,it(ηi) = lnNr
f
it/rit − ln[exp(zx,i)/(1 + exp(zx,i))],
˜ ω3,it(ηi) = lnXm
it /Xit − αm ln[exp(zm,i)/(1 + exp(zm,i)].
Since whether we may observe ˜ ω2,it and ˜ ω3,it or not depends on the export/import choices,
we use the following conditional density function to compute the likelihood contribution from
revenues and export/import intensities:
gω(˜ ωit|dit) =

     
     
gω1(˜ ω1,it) for dit = (0,0),
gω1(˜ ω1,it)gω2|ω1(˜ ω2,it|˜ ω1,it) for dit = (1,0),
gω1(˜ ω1,it)gω3|ω1(˜ ω3,it|˜ ω1,it) for dit = (0,1),
gω(˜ ωit) for dit = (1,1),
where gω1( ) is a marginal distribution of ω1,it while gωj|ω1( |ω1,it) is a conditional distribution
of ωj,it given ω1,it for j = 2,3. Speciﬁcally, given the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition
of Σω, we may write (ω1,it,ω2,it,ω3,it)′ ≡ (λ11e1,it,λ21e1,it+λ22e2,it,λ31e1,it+λ32e2,it+λ33e3,it)′,
where λm,n is the (m,n)-th element of Λω, and ej,it is independently distributed N(0,1) for all









for j = 2,3.
A.2 Counterfactual Experiments
Denote the equilibrium aggregate price under the parameter θ by P(θ). Suppose that we are
interested in a counterfactual experiment characterized by a counterfactual parameter vector
˜ θ that is diﬀerent from the estimated parameter vector ˆ θ. Recall that we have the following
relationship between α0 and the equilibrium price P:




+ (σ − 1)lnP(ˆ θ),
38where the aggregate price is explicitly written as a function of θ. At the counterfactual aggregate
price P(˜ θ), the coeﬃcient α0 takes a value of




+ (σ − 1)lnP(˜ θ) = ˆ α0 + k(˜ θ, ˆ θ),
where




represents the equilibrium price change (up to the parameter (σ − 1)).
Thus, replacing ˆ α0 with ˜ α0, we may evaluate the revenue function (29) at the counterfactual
aggregate price P(˜ θ) (i.e. at the counterfactual value of α0):
r(ηi,dit;k(˜ θ, ˆ θ)) = exp
 
k(˜ θ, ˆ θ) + ˆ α0 + ln[1 + exp(zx,i)]dx















η′,dit; ˜ θ,k(˜ θ, ˆ θ)
 
is the solution to the Bellman equations (16)-(18) when the revenue
function (33) is used to compute proﬁts and gη(η′; ˜ θ) is the probability density function from
which the initial plant characteristic vector is drawn.33
A.3 Additional Empirical Results for Wearing Apparel and Plastic Products
Tables 11-12 show the results of counterfactual experiments for wearing apparel and plastic
products. The basic patterns of the results are similar across industries although the magnitudes
of the impact of counterfactual policies are diﬀerent.
Tables 13 and 14 compare the actual and the predicted transition pattern of export and
import status for wearing apparel and plastic product, respectively.




′,dit; ˜ θ,k(˜ θ, ˆ θ)
￿
is strictly increasing in k(˜ θ, ˆ θ).
39Table 11: Counterfactual Experiments for Wearing Apparel
Counterfactual Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Autarky No Trade in No Trade in No 10% inc. 10% inc.
Trade Final Goods Intermediates Complement. in τx in τm
∆lnP 0.000 0.033 0.014 0.025 0.004 0.002 0.005
∆ ln(Average ϕ) 0.000 -0.030 -0.014 -0.011 0.004 -0.003 -0.004
∆ ln(Average TFP) 0.000 -0.136 -0.016 -0.117 0.003 -0.003 -0.041
A Fraction of Exporters 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.078 0.115 0.121
A Fraction of Importers 0.219 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.177 0.217 0.201
Aggregate Exports 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.878 0.683 0.964
Aggregate Imports 1.000 0.000 0.887 0.000 0.925 0.981 0.715
Table 12: Counterfactual Experiments for Plastic Products
Counterfactual Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Autarky No Trade in No Trade in No 10% inc. 10% inc.
Trade Final Goods Intermediates Complement. in τx in τm
∆lnP 0.000 0.069 0.014 0.064 0.005 0.002 0.012
∆ ln(Average ϕ) 0.000 -0.014 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.002
∆ ln(Average TFP) 0.000 -0.339 -0.005 -0.326 0.006 -0.001 -0.097
A Fraction of Exporters 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.140 0.228 0.235
A Fraction of Importers 0.426 0.000 0.358 0.000 0.377 0.425 0.401
Aggregate Exports 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.858 0.780 0.950
Aggregate Imports 1.000 0.000 0.955 0.000 0.978 0.992 0.786
Table 13: Transition of Export/Import Status for Wearing Apparel (Actual vs. Predicted)
(1) No-Export (2) Export (3) No-Export (4) Export
/No-Import /No-Import /Import /Import
Actual
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.911 0.025 0.060 0.004
Export/No-Import at t 0.255 0.553 0.032 0.160
No-Export/Import at t 0.244 0.015 0.676 0.065
Export/Import at t 0.028 0.063 0.113 0.796
New Entrants 0.794 0.049 0.081 0.076
Steady State Distribution 0.742 0.048 0.137 0.073
Predicted
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.908 0.023 0.058 0.011
Export/No-Import at t 0.239 0.605 0.022 0.134
No-Export/Import at t 0.221 0.008 0.699 0.072
Export/Import at t 0.045 0.139 0.176 0.640
New Entrants 0.882 0.028 0.070 0.020
Steady State Distribution 0.720 0.061 0.155 0.064
40Table 14: Transition of Export/Import Status for Plastic Products (Actual vs. Predicted)
(1) No-Export (2) Export (3) No-Export (4) Export
/No-Import /No-Import /Import /Import
Actual
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.845 0.029 0.108 0.018
Export/No-Import at t 0.162 0.412 0.118 0.309
No-Export/Import at t 0.193 0.021 0.661 0.125
Export/Import at t 0.030 0.068 0.091 0.810
New Entrants 0.626 0.050 0.268 0.056
Steady State Distribution 0.532 0.049 0.234 0.184
Predicted
No-Export/No-Import at t 0.823 0.028 0.125 0.023
Export/No-Import at t 0.143 0.575 0.042 0.240
No-Export/Import at t 0.191 0.012 0.703 0.094
Export/Import at t 0.029 0.154 0.159 0.659
New Entrants 0.779 0.028 0.154 0.038
Steady State Distribution 0.487 0.087 0.274 0.152
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